Abstract-The problem of detecting the presence of timevarying flows in multi-hop wireless networks is considered. In particular, from transmission timing measurements, a test is constructed to determine whether there is a flow of data packets between a pair of nodes. It is assumed that the packet flows may have time-varying (piecewise constant) flow rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the problem of detecting the presence of time-varying flows in a multi-hop wireless network. In a wireless network, suppose that we record transmission timings (epochs) of nodes R 1 and R 2 , and R 1 and R 2 may have time-varying (piecewise constant) transmission rates. The transmission epochs of R 1 and R 2 may correspond to different scenarios: Some of these epochs may correspond to a packet flow 1 from R 1 to R 2 , or vice versa. The flows between R 1 and R 2 may be bidirectional. It is also possible that there is no flow between R 1 and R 2 , and the transmission epochs at these two nodes represent independent transmissions to their corresponding neighboring nodes. Our objective is to detect the presence of a flow between R 1 and R 2 .
This problem has a number of practical applications. In intrusion detection, the interactive stepping stone attack has the property that a sequence of nodes (stepping stones) in the attack path relay packets back and forth. For surveillance applications, using simple monitoring devices, one may be able to figure out the networking configurations, routes, and possibly the roots of multicasting trees. Fig. 1 illustrates a specific application to network security, where transmission epochs of a wireless device (R 1 ) and an access point (R 2 ) are recorded. By detecting the flow between R 1 and R 2 , one can see whether R 1 is injecting packets into the area covered by the access point R 2 .
Using timing for flow detection is nontrivial, partly because we do not assume any information from packet headers; only the timing of transmission is used. Of course, header information may be available in many cases. Such information Work in this paper was sponsored by Army Research Office MURI Program under award W911NF-08-1-0238. The first author was partially supported by Samsung Scholarship. 1 If R 2 is relaying some packets received from R 1 to its neighboring node, the transmission epochs of those packets at R 1 and R 2 correspond to the flow from R 1 to R 2 . should then be incorporated into the detection scheme, which is beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, when there exists a flow between R 1 and R 2 , some of their transmission epochs might not correspond to the flow. Such epochs are referred to as chaff epochs. Chaff epochs can originate from various sources. A node might multiplex the transmissions of intersecting flows, and it can also add dummy transmissions to confuse the detection system. In the absence of any header information, we need to impose certain constraint on how nodes relay packets that belong to a certain flow. A practical constraint is that, if a node forwards a flow packet, it must forward the packet within a deadline Δ. Such a delay constraint is essential for timesensitive applications such as VoIP, video streaming, etc..
A. Related Work
Our work was motivated by a series of previous works on timing-based detection of two-hop unidirectional flows, which has been actively studied in the context of steppingstone detection [1] . To deal with encrypted traffic, researchers restricted the observations to the timing measurements. Donoho et al. [2] were the first to employ the flow model with a maximum delay constraint. Their multiscale analysis was shown to be able to detect a flow if the flow lasts for a sufficiently long time. Following their seminal work, many practical algorithms were proposed to detect flows with a maximum delay constraint (see references in [3] ). Donoho et al. [2] also mentioned about the chaff insertion with the claim that their algorithm can detect a flow if the chaff portion is independent of the flow. The independent chaff insertion was also considered by Zhang et al. [4] with the assumption that only one node is allowed to insert chaff transmissions.
The flow detection becomes more challenging if arbitrary chaff insertion is allowed. For arbitrary chaff insertion, Blum et [5] proposed the counting-based algorithm, and analyzed the tradeoff between the sample size and the error probabilities. He and Tong [6] also considered arbitrary chaff insertion and proposed a matching-based algorithm. Under the Poisson traffic assumption, a threshold τ was shown to exist such that if the fraction of chaff is less than τ , the flow is detectable; otherwise, the flow can be hidden by proper chaff insertion.
However, since the aforementioned studies on unidirectional flow detection were done in the context of stepping-stone detection, they excluded the possibility of the presence of bidirectional flows which are common in wireless networks 2 . Hence, their algorithms need to be adjusted for use in wireless networks. Kim and Tong [7] modified the algorithm in [6] to detect a flow in wireless networks. In this paper, we improve the algorithm in [7] so that it can deal with the traffic with varying rates.
B. Summary of Contributions and Organization
First, to detect a flow in the traffic with varying rates, we improve Bidirectional Flow Detector (BFD) 3 , the flow detector presented in [7] . Our detection algorithm has several advantages over BFD: (i) Our algorithm can detect a flow even though it is contained in the traffic with varying rates. (ii) BFD needs an accurate threshold that heavily depends on the traffic characteristic, but our algorithm does not require it. (iii) Our algorithm can be used as a heuristic to detect a flow in the traffic with unknown characteristics.
For continuous monitoring of flows, we propose a sliding window technique in which we repeatedly run our detection algorithm over the fixed number of most recent samples, while removing old samples as new samples are collected. We present numerical performance analysis for our techniques, using the MSN VoIP traffic and the synthetic Poisson traffic. Overall, the numerical results are promising, and the monitoring algorithm was able to detect a flow with a reasonably small detection delay and a low false alarm frequency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce notations employed throughout the paper, and formulate the flow detection problem. Section III and Section IV present the flow detection algorithm and the monitoring algorithm, respectively. Then, supporting numerical results follow in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper with remarks.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
We model the transmission timings of each node as a point process. Uppercase bold letters (e.g., S) denote point processes, and lowercase bold letters (e.g., s) denote their realizations. S(i) is a random variable representing the ith transmission epoch, and s(i) is its realization. In addition, S denotes the set of all epochs in the realization s. We define a superposition operator for a pair of increasing sequences:
, where c i is the ith smallest element among the elements of two sequences 4 . Then, we mathematically define a flow between a pair of nodes as follows. ensures that every transmission satisfies causality and the delay bound Δ. We define that a pair of point processes S 1 and S 2 contain a flow if they can be partitioned into the flow part (F i ) and the chaff part (W i ) such that (F 1 , F 2 ) is a flow and
The flow detection is formulated as follow. Let S 1 and S 2 denote the transmission processes of R 1 and R 2 , respectively. Given the measurements (s i )
we test the following hypotheses:
H 0 : S 1 and S 2 are independent H 1 : S 1 and S 2 contain a flow (1)
III. FLOW DETECTION: TRAFFIC WITH VARYING RATES

A. Fundamental Limit of Timing-based Detection
Under H 0 , intuitively, any pair of S 1 and S 2 can be partitioned into the flow part and the chaff part, if the flow rate is sufficiently low. This implies that if a flow rate is low and a large amount of chaff transmissions are allowed, then R 1 and R 2 can hide a flow between them by mimicking H 0 . Hence, a flow is detectable only if its strength is strong enough compared to the chaff portion. Under H 1 , the flow strength can be measured by the relative flow rate defined as below.
under H 1 , and
denote the realizations of the flow part and the chaff part, respectively. Then, the relative flow rate is defined as
Therefore, R f (t) is the fraction of flow epochs in the observations up to time t, and high R f (t) means that the flow strength is strong compared to the chaff portion. 
B. Background: Bidirectional Flow Detector
This section introduces an existing timing-based algorithm for flow detection, Bidirectional Flow Detector (BFD) 5 proposed in [7] . BFD calculates an upper bound on the actual R f (t), denoted byR f (t), and compares it to a predetermined threshold τ to make a decision. Specifically, BFD takes the following form.
Given
is obtained by the below optimization. max fi, wi :
is a realization of a flow with a maximum delay constraint Δ.
into the flow part and the chaff part such that the flow part is maximized. In [7] , a matching algorithm called BidirectionalBounded-Greedy-Match (BiBGM) was proposed and proved to achieve this optimal partitioning by finding a maximum number of valid matches. Given 
The implementation of BiBGM is given in Table. I. Its computational complexity is O(|S 1 | + |S 2 |), which is linear with respect to the sample size. 5 For better description, we rename Packet-Forward-Detect [7] to BFD. [7] BiBGM(s1, s2, Δ):
s2(n) is chaff; n ← n + 1; 5:
else if s2(n) > s1(m)
Under the Poisson traffic assumption, the performance of BFD was analyzed in [7] . Under H 0 ,R f (t) converges almost surely to a constant τ 0 , which depends on the rates of S 1 and S 2 . For any positive number ( < τ 0 ), BFD with the threshold τ 0 + is shown to be consistent 6 if R f under H 1 is greater than τ 0 + . In addition, when the chaff parts of S 1 and S 2 are independent Poisson processes, a flow can be detected by BFD consistently, regardless of its strength.
C. Adaptive Flow Detector
In this section, we present Adaptive Flow Detector (AFD), a detection algorithm aimed at detecting a flow in the traffic with varying rates.
The motivation for AFD stems from the following limitations of BFD. To set a proper threshold τ of BFD, we need to know the details of the traffic characteristics, including the interarrival distribution and the traffic rates. However, estimation of such information generally requires a long time and a large number of samples. Furthermore, some traffic characteristics (e.g., traffic rates) might vary in the middle of the observation interval. Hence, we need an adaptive scheme that can detect a flow even though the traffic characteristics are unknown and time-varying.
Instead of a predetermined threshold, AFD employs an adaptive threshold that is obtained based on the measurements as follows. As a first step, AFD assumes temporal independence to approximate the H 0 traffic using the measurements. Fig. 3 describes the approximation procedure, referred to as Independent-Traffic Approximation (ITA). ITA has two parameters, the synthesis window width W S and the gap α (α ≥ Δ) between subsequent windows. The intuition behind ITA is that if α is large enough, then the epochs of S 1 in A1 and the epochs of S 2 in B1 will tend to be uncorrelated, even when a flow exists. Given the measurements (s i ) Fig. 3 . ITA: The W S -second intervals A1, A2, B1, and B2 are cut from the measurements and assembled to approximate the H 0 traffic.
TABLE II ADAPTIVE FLOW DETECTOR (AFD)
AFD(s1, s2, Δ, t, WS , α, ):
a2 ← a1 − i(WS + 2α) − (WS + α) 9:s2 ←s2 ⊕ a2 10: end 11:τ ← BiBGM(s1,s2, Δ)
] is a subsequence of si consisting of the epochs in [t1, t2]. * For a sequence (xi)
and a real number r, (xi)
where yi = xi − r, ∀i.
3) Take the epochs of s 2 in [W S + α, 2W S + α], subtract W S + α from the epochs, and add them tos 2 . 4) For i = 1, 2, . . . , , and letR f (t) denote the resultingR f .
. Letτ (t) denote the resultingR f . 3) IfR f (t) ≥τ (t) + , declare H 1 ; otherwise, declare H 0 . If H 0 is true,R f (t) andτ (t) are expected to be close. Instead of a predetermined threshold τ , AFD uses an adaptive thresholdτ (t)+ , where is added to allow a small difference betweenR f (t) andτ (t) under H 0 . If H 1 is true and the relative flow rate is high enough,R f (t) is expected to be greater then τ (t). Implementation of AFD is given in Table. II. It contains ITA in the lines 2-10. The computational complexity of AFD is O(|S 1 | + |S 2 |).
In ITA, the number of epochs in
is at most a half of that of the original measurements. Fig. 4 describes a heuristic (which we refer to as ITAh) to double the number of epochs in (s i )
. Although no further analysis is provided, numerical results in Section V show that this heuristic leads to a better performance of AFD. In the upcoming analysis and the simulations in Section V, AFD employs ITA, not ITAh, unless otherwise specified.
In the rest of this section, we present a theorem stating the performance of AFD for a sufficiently large t. Suppose that S 1 and S 2 are Poisson processes. Under H 1 , let F i and W i denote the flow and chaff part of S i respectively, and suppose the following 7 are true: 
and W 2 are independent, and (α i ) respectively, and λ
. Suppose that, under H 1 , R f is greater than σ + a.s., where
Then, if t goes to infinity, the miss detection probability of AFD with vanishes and its false alarm probability decays exponentially fast.
Sketch of Proof:
Lett denote the time length of (s i ) 2 i=1 . Then,t = t 2(WS +α) W S . Due to the traffic assumptions,S 1 andS 2 are independent nonhomogeneous Poisson processes, regardless of the true hypothesis. In addition, for sufficiently large t, the rates ofS 1 andS 2 in [(
The performance of AFD depends on how well (S i ) 2 i=1 approximate H 0 traffic. However, under H 1 , the fact that a flow exists does not give enough detail about the correlation between S 1 and S 2 , which affects the quality of the H 0 approximation. Hence, to assess the performance of AFD, we impose more assumptions to further specify the correlation. 8 
are λ
10 thatτ (t) converges to σ a.s.. (i) False alarm probability: The false alarm probability is
By following the proof procedure of theorem 6.4 in [3] , Sanov's theorem [8] can be used to show that both terms in the last line decay exponentially fast.
(ii) Miss detection probability: Under H 1 , the optimality of BiBGM implies thatR f (t) ≥ R f (t) a.s.. Therefore, lim inf t→∞R f (t) ≥ R f > σ + a.s.. In addition,τ (t) converges to σ a.s.. Hence, the miss detection probability
vanishes as t goes to infinity.
Corollary 4.1 in [7] implies that if S 1 and S 2 are independent Poisson processes with rates λ 2 respectively, then lim t→∞R f (t) = γ i . Note that σ is the weighted mean of γ i s, where the weight of γ i is the ratio of the number of epochs in the ith interval to the number of total epochs.
IV. MONITORING ALGORITHM
For continuous monitoring, we propose a sliding window technique utilizing AFD as its building block, which we refer to as Adaptive Flow Monitor (AFM). AFM has two integer parameters, the sliding window size (W ) and the test period (β). AFM repeatedly executes AFD over the W most recent samples, which we refer to as the observation window, whenever new β samples arrive. AFM is aimed at detecting the presence of a flow in the observation window.
At every β sample arrivals, AFM executes the following:
by adding new β epochs, and update (s i ) 2 i=1 accordingly using ITA. 2) Run BiBGM over the updated portion of (s i )
to find new matches. 3) Based on matches, calculateR f using only the epochs in the observation interval. Calculateτ using only the epochs in (s i ) 2 i=1 whose original epochs before ITA are in the observation interval. 4) Declare H 1 if R f ≥τ + ; otherwise, declare H 0 . The computational complexity of AFM is linear with respect to the number of all the monitored samples.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Numerical Results: AFD
We first use the synthetic Poisson traffic with varying rates to test the performance of AFD. In the first half of samples, S 1 and S 2 have the rates λ 2 , and in the other half, the 9 In general, there exists small intervals (with length less than W S ) around (
ρ i )t, k = 1, . . . , m − 1, in which the rates will disagree with this statement. However, their effect vanishes as t increases.
10 Note that CTR(t) in [7] is equivalent to 1 −R f (t). 11 P i denotes the probability measure conditioning on that H i is true. 
1 and λ
2 . For H 0 traffic, we generated the realizations of two independent Poisson processes. For H 1 traffic, Fig . 5 shows the ROC curves of AFD. The ROC curves are obtained by plotting the false alarm probability (x axis) and the detection probability (y axis) of AFD with , while increasing from 0 to 1 by 0.01. We tested two different approximation procedures, ITA (solid line) and ITAh (dashed line). The ROC curves imply that ITAh results in a better performance. In AFD,τ (t) plays a role of an estimate of the threshold τ in BFD, and it is obtained by running BiBGM over (s i )
Compared to ITA, ITAh uses twice more samples to obtain τ (t), so it is natural to expect that ITAh would give a better performance. As the sample size increases, the ROC curves moves to the upper left corner implying a better detection performance.
We also test AFD using the MSN VoIP traffic, which is a representative example of traffic with a delay constraint. As described in Fig. 1 , we located one laptop (R 1 ) in one room and two laptops (R 3 , R 4 ) in another room. R 1 is connected to a wireless LAN via the access point R 0 , and R 3 and R 4 are connected to a wireless LAN via the access point R 2 , where two access points are using different channels. Under H 1 , R 1 has an MSN VoIP call with R 3 , and R 4 downloads a file (with 20kB/s rate limit) from an FTP server in our laboratory. Under H 0 , R 1 and R 3 make independent VoIP calls, and R 4 downloads a file from the same server. We recorded 13 the transmission epochs of R 1 (s 1 ) and those of the access point R 2 (s 2 ). s 1 consists of MSN VoIP packets and control/management packets, and s 2 consists of MSN VoIP packets for R 3 , FTP data packets for R 4 , and control/management packets (except beacon packets). Table III shows the result of the experiment. The result implies that AFD works reasonably well for the MSN VoIP traffic, and it works well as a heuristic to detect a flow in traffic with unknown characteristics. 
B. Numerical Results: AFM
In Fig. 6 , the sample paths ofR f ,τ , andR f −τ are given to visualize how these statistics of AFM change when the traffic characteristics change dynamically. When there is no flow,R f andτ are almost same. However, once a flow appears, they begin to diverge from each other.
We looked at two metrics to measure the performance of AFM. First, we consider the average number of samples (T F ) that AFM observes until it generates the first false alarm when it is run over the H 0 traffic. T F can tell us how often AFM would generate false alarms. Second, we look at the average of the detection delay (T D ) which is defined as the number of samples that AFM observes to detect a flow 14 . To numerically obtain T F , we generated the realizations of independent Poisson processes S 1 and S 2 with rates λ 1 and λ 2 , and ran AFM on them. With a period of 1000 sample arrivals, (λ 1 , λ 2 ) rotates among (10, 10), (10, 20) , (20, 20) , and (20, 10). For T D , we first generated the realizations of independent Poisson processes with λ 1 = λ 2 = 12. Then, we made a flow to appear at a certain time (λ 1 = λ 2 = 20, f c = 0.2 or 0.6), and measured the detection delay. Table IV contains the result. The increase in f c or W results in longer T D . This is reasonable because such changes makes AFD, the building block of AFM, less sensitive to the appearance of a flow. As W increases, T F also increases, and it increases much faster than T D . Such fast increasement of T F seems to agree with the exponential dacay of AFD's false alarm probability (as the sample size grows). When W = 8000, T F is 923330, and it means that AFM takes 30778 seconds (8.55 hours) to generate the first false alarm on average.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studied timing-based detection of time-varying flows in wireless networks. We proposed a practical algorithm to detect a flow contained in the traffic with varying rates and unknown characteristics. Then, we presented a sliding window technique for continuous monitoring. Our algorithms require only the transmission timings of nodes, which are easily available in wireless networks. We tested the algorithms using the MSN VoIP traffic and the synthetic Poisson traffic, and the results are encouraging.
